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EDITORIAL.
AN ALUMNI ASSOCIATION.
Already one hundred and seven students
have received the diploma of the Dickinson School of Law since its reorganization
in 1890. The class graduating this year
will add about thirty to that number. Is
it not time to form an Alumni Association?
Such associations of graduates of seminaries and colleges have become universal.
Whatever reasons may be urged for them,
may be more powerfully invoked for an
association of the graduates of a law
school. They pursue the same vocation.
As they settle at scattered points, they do
not become competitors in business with
each other. It often happens that lawyers
have claims against persons who reside in
other localities than their own, and are
obliged to select some attorney at the
residence of the debtor. Unless there
were countervailing reasons, an alumnus,
needing to secure the services of a distant
lawyer, would prefer a fellow alumnus to
An association would be a
another.
means of making the alumni personally
acquainted, and of deepening an interest
in each other.
An ordinary student does not pass
through college or a professional school
without forming a warm attachment for
it and for his fellow students. He becomes
interested in the success of the school, in
The
its eminence, and its influence.
school's success depends incalculably on
the loyal sentiments of its alumni. The

tender regret with which the graduate
recalls his school life will be* gradually
weakened unless appropriate impressions
are revived from time to time. Nothing
could so surely perpetuate the love for alma
mater, as frequent return to it, and renewal of association with its visiting
sons. An association would promote reunions in Carlisle, and would disseminate
interesting information concerning its
members and concerning the current life
of the school.
We have heard with pleasure that the
class of 1896 has formed a permanent organization. What hinders its members
meeting next commencement, and, in
conjunction with the class then to graduate, initiating the larger society that
shall include all the alumni of the school.
The class of 1896 is the largest yet graduated. It represents several states, and
many counties of this state. It contains
a large amount of ability, and is sure to
give the profession in a few years many
lawyers of eminence. A striking unity
and amity characterized the relations of
its members to each other, and their affection for the school is certainly not less than
that which alumni of similar institutions
usually feel. It was reported sometime
ago that the president of this class, irank
C. Bosler, Esq., of Carlisle, was intending
to issue a call for a meeting at the next
commencement. Will he pardon us, if we
thus publicly express the hope that he will
not only convoke his own class, but also
take steps to inaugurate a general alumni
association,
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THE ALUMNI.
R. Banister Gibson, '94, who has been
practicing in New Bloomfield, Perry Co.,
Pa. since his graduation, has lately formed
a partnership with his brother and they
are now located at Erie. We wish the new
firm abundant success in their new home.
*

**

Arthur C. Lackey, '95, one of the rising
young attorneys of the Perry County Bar,
visited Carlisle a few weeks ago, and called
upon his friends at the school. He expressed his delight in noting the improvements that have been made in the law
school building since his graduation. He
is located at Duncannon.
Dr. Johp C. Long, '95, is engaged in the
practice of the legal profession in Carlisle.
He has his office on Court House Avenue
with Duncan M. Graham, Esq.
On Wednesday, April 21st, Evan J.
Jones, of the class of '96, was married to
Miss Luella M. Sykes, an estimable young
lady of Bensinger, Elk County, Pa. Our
most hearty congratulations are hereby
extended to the young couple. Mr. Jones
has built up an unusually large practice at
St. Mary's, Pa., since his location there
last September.
J. Harris Curran, '96, who so acceptably
fills the chair of professor of mathematics
at the Tome Institute, Port Deposit, Md.,
visited Carlisle recently.
W. F. Shean, '96, of Scranton, spent a
Sunday in Carlisle during the month of
April. Mr. Shean is succeeding well in
Scranton.
David J. Glennon, '96, has located at
Pittston, Luzerne county's youngest city.
He has an office in the Miner's Bank building, a large new structure, and the finest
office building in Pittston. Mr. Glemon
is prospering in the profession.
P. Frank Loughran, '93, is practicing at
Hazleton, Pa. He is prominently identified with Republican politics in that portion of Luzerne county.

Samuel S. Herring, '92, is the most prominent candidate for the Democratic nomination for District Attorney of Luzerne
County. His nomination and election
would be a fitting compliment to his ability as a practitioner, and we wish him
success.
Samuel E. Morrow, 196, of Altoona, spent
a few hours in Carlisle recently and made
a short call at the school. His many
friends here were pleased to see him. He
is the junior member of the law firm of
Morrow and Morrow.
James F. Santee, '96, has not yet entered
upon the practice of his profession and is
at present principal of the high school at
Shickshinny, Luzerue County, Pa.

THE SCHOOL.
Garrett Stevens, of Reading, entered the
School in April. He came to Dickinson
from Yale University.
The Senior class has decided to wear
caps and gowns for their Commencenient
exercises to be held in Bosler Hall, on
June 7th. They will be the first class
from the Law School to wear caps and
gowns.
Charles E. Horn, of Scranton, was called
home last month by the death of his
mother. Martin Herr, of Merchantville,
N. J., was summoned to his home by the
death of his father. Both young men are
Juniors. We extend our sympathy to
these gentlemen in their bereavement.
The Delta Chi fraternity of the Dickinson School of Law removed from the
third floor of the Stuart Building to their
Chapter House at Diffely's Point on Hanover street extension.
A number of English ivy vines were
planted on the West and Pomfret street
sides of the Law School Building by
Frank C. Bosler, Esq., who has shown a
very deep interest in the school's welfare.
In a few months the building will present
a changed appearance.
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The subject upon which competition
for the Edward Thompson Company's
prize of the complete set of the American
and English Encyclopedia of reading and
Practice will be based, has been announced
by Dean Trickett to be "The defences
available by the maker of a promissory
note against the indorsee." A large numher of the Seniors have entered the contest
which closes June 1st.
G. H. Moyer, of the Junior class, is one
of the four chosen candidates selected by
Senator Gobin to be sent as delegate from
Lebanon Co. to advance the General's
interests in the next Republican State
Convention which will be held at Harrisburg next August. If elected, and there
is little doubt but that he will be, Mr.
Moyer will have the honor of nominating
General Gobin for the Auditor Generalship.
A dramatization of the thrilling psychological story, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde," by Robert Louis Stevenson, was
given in the Sentinel Opera House Friday
evening, April 30th, by students of the
Junior class of the Law School. A large
audience, representative of Carlisle's best
people, witnessed the play and deservedly
applauded the players. Every part moved
with a professional precision, fnd the participants seemed especially fitted for their
particular parts of the cast. Cleon Nivelle
Berntheizel took the leading role, and performed admirably the difficult parts and
rapid changes. Each participant won
many enconiums. The acting was easy
and natural, and the players showed
a capability of rising to the exact requirements of the climaxes. The complete cast
of characters was: Dr. Jekyll, Mr. Hyde,
Cleon Nivelle Berntheizel; Mr. Utterson,
G. H. Moyer; Dr. Lanyon, Fred B. Moser;
Rev. Danvers Carew, G. Frank Wetzel;
Inspector Nqucombe, A. T. Morgan; Philandar Poole, J. Thompson Caldwell; Guest;
Adair Herman; Sarah, Miss Lubertha
Jackson; Mrs. Poole, Miss Katherine
Boyer; Clara Carew, Miss Josephine
Duke; Business Manager, C. N. Berntheizel; Stage Director, Adair Herman;
Musical Director, W. Lloyd Snyder.
The play was produced for the benefit of
the library fund. The play will be given
in some of the neighboring towns.

LECTURES BY PRESIDENT REED.

Dr. George Edward Reed, President of
Dickinson College and Law School, on
Friday evening, April 23rd, delivered before.the law students the first of a series
of lectures on" Forensic Eloquence." The
spontaneity of applause on several occasions bespoke how eagerly and gratefully
the student body drank in the excellent
instruction on oratory. In the first lecture, Dr. Reed dwelt upon the necessity
for logical form in the body of an address,
and the importance of cultivating an oratorical bearing. He emphasized that, first
of all for oratorical effect, a speaker should
acquire a correct pose, one that would be
impressive to an audience and which
would allow graceful gestures. Then he
illustrated what power is in the eye and
how it should be used for telling effect on
on audience. The function of the head in
oratorical bearing was touched upon, and
then Dr. Reed gave the four plahes, basic
of gestures. He described them to be:
For the expression of thoughts of degradation and the like, a plane even with the
belt; for feelings of sympathy, a plane
level with the heart; for manifestation of
strength, gestures direct from the shoulders; and for utterance of sentiment or
aesthetic thoughts, movements from or
above the head. The hygienic importance
of correct posture and gestures was explained also. Before- conclusion, Dr.
Reed gave with powerful effect, as the
key-note of oratory, lines from Hamlet in
the opening of Scene II, Act III, of
"Hamlet."
The second lecture of the series was given
by Dr. Reed on Wednesday evening, April
28, and again the speaker gave practical
instruction in the important study of
"Forensic Eloquence." Dr. Reed referred,
in the commencement of the address, to
the voice as a power in oratory. He explained how to produce a good voice as a
fitting vehicle to speech, and told of the
hygienic necessity of proper respiration.
Then he illustrated hand movements as
giving force to gestures. The important
functions of the voice and hands were explained at length, and illustrated splendidly by a noted speech in Parliament,
Dr. Reed reciting it.
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THE SOCIETIES.
W. J. Shearer, Esq., one of the prominent members of the Cumberland County
bar, lectured before the student body on
Friday evening, April 9th. His subject
-ar.
was "Some Celebrated Cases."
Shearer appeared before the student body
on a previous occasion during the winter,
and on each occasion gave a lecture that
was replete with instruction and interesting from beginning to end. From the
cases which he cited in his lecture, he
drew legal principles which he presented
so plainly as to make lasting impressions
on the minds of his hearers.
Professor Geo. Edward Mills, the member of the faculty, whose picture appears
in this issue of THE FORUM, sat as judge
at a moot court case in the Allison Law
Society on Wednesddy evening, April 9th.
The members of the society appreciated
his clear exposition of the law in the case
argued before him.

THE MOOT COURT.
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR OF WALKER TOWNSHIP vs. OVERSEERS,
ETC., OF PORTER TOWNSHIP.
Liabilityfor relief of pauper-Orderof
relief-Order of removal-Case of sudden
emergency.
Rule to show cause why Porter Township should not be held liable for the support of Essic Kline.
JOHN HARRIS WILLIAMS and HORACE

CODINGON for rule.
A district is bound to furnish relief, until the poor person can be removed to place
of settlement.-Act of June 13, 1836, 5, 2
P. & L. 3531; Overseers of Taylor v. Overseers of Shenango, 114 Pa. 394; Kelly
Twp. v. Union Twp., 5 W. & S. 535.Such relief can be given without a previous order of relief, in cases of sudden
emergency.-I) rectors of Poor v. Wallace,
8 W. & S. 94; Directors, etc, Chester Co.
v. Worthington, 38 Pa. 160; Directors v.
Murry, 32 Pa. 178; Nippenose v. Jersey
Shore, 48 Pa. 407.
Walker township can then collect such
amount expended from Porter township.

-Overseers

of South Huntingdon v. Over-

seers of East Huntingdon, 7 W1. 527; Bradford v. Keating, 3 Casey 275; Directors v.
Murry, supra; Nippenose v. Jersey Shore,
supra.
A. A. WINGERT and JULIAN C. WALKER contra.
Porter township cannot be held liable
for the amount expended in giving relief
to Kline, as the relief was not founded on
a previous order.-Act of June 13, ]836, .6,
2 . & L. 3532; Overseers v. Baker's Estate, 2 W. 280; Pickett v. Erie County
Poor Directors, 3 Pa. C. C. 541. Neither
has an order of removal been obtained.Act of '36, supra, . 16, 2 P. & L. 3536; Elk
Twp. v. Jordan Twp., 10 Pa. C. C. 245;
Overseers of Gilpin Twp. v. Overseers of
Parks Twp., 118 Pa. 84. It does not appear that this was a case of a sudden emergency, nor was an order of relief subsequently obtained.
OPINION OF COURT.

Essic Kline, settled in Porter Township,
came to a family in Walker Township
and while there, became seriously sick.
Advised of his illness, the overseers of
Walker Township called to see him, but
the proprietress of the house, having a teakettle of hot water in her hand, forbade
their entering, saying, "if you come inside
my house, I will scald you." They did not
enter. Without an order of relief, the overseers requested John Macfarlane, a physiclan, to attend the sick man. He did so and
they have paid him twenty-five dollars,
his fees for such attendance.
Although Essic Kline was not settled in
Walker Township, it was under a statutory duty to take care of him. It is the
duty "of every district to furnish relief to
every poor person within the district, not
having a settlement therein, who shall
apply to them for relief until such person
can be removed to the place of his settlement." Section 5, ActJune 13, 1836, 2 P.
& L. 3531. Overseers of Taylor v. Overseers of Shenango, 114 Pa. 394; Overseers
v. McCoy, 2 P. & W. 432.
The sixth section of the Act of 13th of
June, 1836, 2 P. & L. 3532, forbids relief to
any poor person, until an order for his relief has been granted by two justices. In
eases of emergency however the courts have
held that the relief may be given without
an order, and a subsequent order by the
justices, approving the relief, will ratify
the previous grant of relief by the overseers, or by a private person, the emergency being so stringent as to preclude
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consultation with the overseers, before the
relief is granted. Directors of the Poor v.
Worthington, 38 Pa. 160; Overseers v.
Bunn, 12 S. & R. 292; Overseers of South
Huntingdon v. Overseers of East Huntingdon, 7 W. 527; Directors v. Wallace, 8
W. & S. 94; Directors v. Murry, 32 Pa.
178; Neale v. Overseers of Plumereek
Township, 12 Pa. C. C. 649; Overseers of
Nippenose v. Overseers of Jersey Shore,
48 Pa. 407. There is no particular time
within which this order of relief must be
procured, after the rendering of the assistance. In 88 Pa. 160, although two and a
half years intervened between the physician's attendance on the injured man, and
his procurement of an approving order
from the two justices, he was allowed to
recover. If then, two justices shall approve the relief, their decision unappealed
from, will be decisive of the liability of
Walker Township, so far as its overseers
Walker township will
are concerned.
then be reimbursable by Porter township.
Overseers of South Huntingdon v. Overseers of East Huntingdon, 7 W. 527; Overseers (if Nippenose v. Overseers of Jersey
Shore, 48 Pa. 402.
But no order of approval of the relief
granted by Walker township by the justices having been obtained, this rule must
be discharged.

139; Braden's Estate, 165 Pa. 184; Brodhead v. Cornman, 171 Pa. 322; Leidich's
Appeal, 161 Pa. 451; Ritter v. Brendlinger,
58 Pa. 68; Am. & Eng..Ency. of Law, 2nd
Ed., Vol. 1, p. 1155; Siner v. Stearne, "155
Pa. 62; Browning v. Hanford, 5 Hill 588;
Wharton on Agency, 550; Missimer v.
Ebersole, 87 Pa. 109.
CLAUDE L. ROTH and A. T. MORGAN
for defendant.
Both parties being in fault neither can
recover damages. - Baker v. )Lewis, 33 Pa.
301; Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 498; Krum
v. Anthony, 115 Pa. 431; Bentley v. Crammer, 137 Pa. 244; Mause v. Traction Co.,
175 Pa. 122; Reigard v. McNeil, 38 Ill. 400.
Sheriff not responsible for goods delivered to a bailee at suggestion of plaintiff in
execution.-Donham v. Wild, 36 Mass.
520; Wood v. Bodine, 32 Hun. 354.
Sheriff not guilty of a tortious act.Polley v. Iron Works, 2 Allen 182; Leonard v. Tidd, 3 Mete. 6; Jones v. Fort, 9 B.
& C. 764; Bromley v. Coxwell, 2 B. & P.
438.
Sheriff not liable for breaches caused by
plaintiff's acts.-Skinner v. Wilson, 61
Miss. 90; Robertson v. Crocker, 11 Ala.
466; Statev. Boyd, 63 Ind. 428; Stryker v.
Mereles, 24 N. J. L. 542; Dorrance v. Com.,
13 Pa. 163.
CHARGE OF COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:John Smith issued aft. fa. against Samuel Sims, which came to the sheriffis
hands at 10:30 a. in., March 5, 1895. Onan
earlier judgment than Smith's recovered
by James Jones before a justice of the
peace, an execution was sent out to a constable, two hours later than that to the
JOHN SMITH vs. LEMUEL ANDERSON.
sheriff. The sheriff, immediately after receiving the writ, levied on a stock of dry
Lien of fierifacias-Liabilityof sheriff goods. The constable made a levy on the
-Assignment for benefit of creditors-Sale same goods two hours afterwards. On
March 7, 1895, Sims made an assignment
by constable after levy by sheriff.
to Smith of the goods on which these
levies had been made, and his other propAction in trespass.
erty, for the benefit of creditors. Smith
B.
FRANK STROUSS and SYLVESTER
took possession of the goods, which, though
16th
June,
SADLER for plaintiff cited : Act
under the two levies, were still in the
1836, P. & L. Vol. 1, p. 1947; Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law, Vol. 7, p. 151; Weidensaul
store. He sold goods for several days, dev. Reynolds, 49 Pa. 77; Earl's Appeal, 12
livering the proceeds to the sheriff. Jones
Trou58
Pa.
70;
v.
Bright,
Pa. 483; Carey
having in no way assented to the assign861;
Vanbat & Ha ly,Vol. 1, p. 886, 896,
ment, or to Smith's taking possession of
valzal v. Croman, I Dist. Rep. 190; Hagan
v. Lucus, 10 Peters 400; Winegardner v.
the goods, then directed the constable
Hafer, 15 Pa. 144; Am. & Eng. Ency. of
to make a sale on his execution. That offiLaw, Vol. 22,_p. 550; Knox v. Summers,
cer thereupon sold enough goods to pro4 Yeates477; Hartlieb v. McLane, 44 Pa.
duce $240, giving the money, less $10
501; Dorrance v. Coin 6 13 Pa. 160; Linton
v. Com., 46 Pa. 294; om. v. Contner, 9
costs, to Jones. The assignee subsequently
Harris 266; Mitchell v. Com., 37 Pa. 187:
sold the remainder of the goods for $4,227,
Trickett on Liens, Vol. 1, p. 327; Burchari
less what he had realized for the goods
Appeal,
377;
Kent's
v. Rees, 1 Wharton,
sold before the constable's sale. Thisisan
87 Pa. 165; Estate of Matthews, 144 Pa.
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action of trespass by John Smith, whose
execution was for $10,000 against the
sheriff, Lemuel Aitderson, for the value of
the goods taken and sold by the constable.
The plaintiff insists that we should instruct you that he must receive your
verdict; the defendant that your verdict
must be for him.
The plaintiff's claim against the sheriff,
rests on two postulates; (1) his right to the
application of the value of the goods taken
by the constable, to his execution; and (2)
the official liability of the sheriff for permitting the constable's diversion of them.
. 1. Theft. fa. became a lien on the goods,
as soon as it came to the hands of the sheriff. The execution directed to the constable did not become a lien until the levy
under it was made. Section 18, Act 20th
March, 1810; 1 Liens, 375, 376. The priority of Smith's execution, is therefore indisputable. He was entitled to the proceeds of the sale made by the constable, unless by some subsequent act of himself or of
the sheriff, he lost his lien. By accepting an
assignment of the goods, Smith did not
lose his lien, nor by taking any possession
of them that was subordinate to that of
the sheriff. Two days elapsed between
the levy and the assignment, during which,
it is possible, Samuel Sims was left in
subordinate possession. The assumption
of the same possession by his successor in
the ownership, Smith, could no more
vitiate the lien of the ft. fa. than that of
Sims. 1 Liens, 333. But besides taking
possession, Smith made sales of goods, accounting to the sheriff for the proceeds.
We are at liberty to infer, then, that the
sheriff had authorized him to make these
sales. That officer may employ a deputy,
or an auctioneer, to make sales without invalidating the lien of the execution. It
does not distinctly appear whether the
sales were made at auction or otherwise.
But if privately and non-competitively,
the lien would not be impaired even as
against a non-consenting creditor with an
execution in the constable's hands. Leidich's Appeal, 161 Pa. 451. Had Jones consented,-as he did not-there could be no
question of the preservation of the liens in
their original order. Kent's Appeal, 87 Pa.
165; Matthew's Estate, 144 Pa. 144.
Nothing appears then, that destroyed
the right of Smith, gained by the anterior-

ity of his execution, to have the proceeds
of the goods covered by the levy applied
to his debt. It has been questioned
whether, after goods have been levied on
by the sheriff, a constable, the officer of a
different court, can levy upon them. Vanvalzal v. Croman, 1 D. R. 190. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that a federal marshal could not levy on
chattels-in this case, slaves--on which,
under process from a state court, a sheriff
had already levied. Hogan v. Lucas, 10
Pet. 400. However, in Winegardner v.
Hafer, 15 Pa. 144, one constable levied on
cattle on which another had already
levied, and in McGinnis v. Prieson, 85
Pa. 111, a sheriff levied on goods on which
a constable had already levied, and actually sold them. Of the legality of this
ouster of the constable, the court had no
occasion to speak, but it awarded to him
enough of the proceeds to satisfy his execution. It is clear then, that whether the
constable could or could not levy on the
goods on which the sheriff had already
levied, he could not legally withdraw them
from the power of the sheriff, so as to prevent his obtaining their proceeds, for the
satisfaction of the execution on which he
had made the levy. The original posteriority of the justice's writ forbade this disturbance of the sheriff's custody. No
later occurrences destroyed the sheriff's
right to retain them.
2. A wrong has then been done to John
Smith. The primary agent in doing it
was the constable. What we now have to
consider is, whether Lemuel Anderson is
liable to the execution creditor for the resulting damage. By his levy, the sheriff
assumes control of the property. It becomes his duty.to preserve it, for the benefit of the creditor, and of the owner, the
debtor. If it is taken away, Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 187; even if it is
stolen, Hartlieb v. MeLane, 44 Pa. 510, he
is answerable. He is bound to use the
vigilance and the force necessary to prevent eloignment; and if, not withstanding,
goods have been eloigned, as he is thereby
made liable, he may in trespass recover
the value of the articles taken from him.
Weidensaul v. Reynolds, 49 Pa. 73. One
constable (therefore a sheriff) can maintain trespass against another who, making a later levy, takes and sells the goods,
Winegardner v. Hafer, 15 Pa. 144.
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Presumptively, then, Anderson the sheriff, is liable to John Smith for the loss of
the proceeds of the goods sold by the constable. The burden is upon him to show
an exoneration. The only exonerating
factssuggested are the possession of Smith.
That possession does not appear to have
been adverse, but rather in subordination
to the sheriff. Was it to be constant or
intermittent? In the day time only, or in
the night as well? Did lie have it when
the constable took the goods? Did the constable take the goods with his connivance,
or despite his resistance? After they were
taken, did he or not inform the sheriff
that they had been taken? If Smith's
possession was that of assignee only, he
had no right to hold the goods as agaiist
the constable; for the lien of the constable's
execution preceded the assignment. If
his possession was as bailiff of the sheriff,
did he undertake to keep the goods, for
the sheriff's benefit, as inviolably as it is
the sheriff's duty towards the execution
creditor to keep them? Did he, in other
words assume towards the sheriff the
position of an insurer of the preservation
of the goods, except in so far as they
should be impaired or removed by the act
of God, sudden accident, or the public
enemy? Hartlieb v. McLane, 44 Pa. 510.
While the burden is on the sheriff'of showing that Smith assumed a certain measure
of duty with respect to the preservation of
the goods, and that had he performed
this duty, in this measure the constable
would not have taken them, he has not
shown either of these requisites to his
discharge. Neither the nature of the
terms under which Smith tookpossession,
nor the circumstances under which the
constable eloigned the goods, have been
made to appear. What is there that shows
that Smith was bound to the same constancy of possession, the same stringency
of vigilance, the same use of force to guard
the things levied on as the sheriff? What
is there that shows that the removal by
the constable of the goods was nob effected
despite the most stubborn resistance that
Smith was obliged to make? If instead
of Smith another person had been the
sheriff's bailiff, could the sheriff upon
what here appears have sustained a recovery against the bailiff? Smith'sliability was not greater than that of an ordinary bailiff, and to prevent his recovering

from the sheriff, we think the facts must
exist, which, had some other person been
the plaintiff in the execution, would have
supported an action by the sheriff against
Smith. Such facts do not appear. We
instruct you therefore, gentlemen of the
jury, that your verdict should be for the
plaintiff for $240, with interest from the
sherilPs return of the plaintiff's execution.

JOHN HARVEY vs. SAMUEL LESLIE.
Afortgagor-Mortgagee-Selling of timber on mortgagedpremises-Damages.
Action of trespass. Motion for non-suit.
HUGH R. MILLER and ANDREW S.
SHOENER for motion.
A mortgagor in possession has the right
to sell, in the usual way, the timber thereon, unless the mortgagee stops him by injunction or estrepement.-Hoskins v.
Woodward, 45 Pa. 42; Witmer's Appeal,
45 Pa. 455 ; Angier v. Agnew, 98 Pa. 587;
Wilson v. Mothey 59 N. Y. 127.
It does not clearly appear that waste was
committed. The land may have depreciated in price for other reasons. The clearing of woodland is, in some cases, good
husbandry.-Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,
Vol. 18, p. 871.
ROBERT H.BARKER and G. B. SNYDER,
contra.
The mortkagor is not allowed to depreciate, in any way, the mortgaged premises
to the detriment of the mortgagee.Wright v. Himes, 7 Mont. 156; Hoskins v.
Woodward, 45 Pa. 42; Witmer's Appeal,
45 Pa. 455.
The mortgagor may sue for the damages
thus occasioned. -Jones v Hoar, 5 Pick.
23.5; Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 120; Salmon v. Davis, 4 Binn. 374.
OPINION OF COURT.

Leslie, on May 4, 1894, mortgaged a tract
of timber land to Harvey for $5,000, but
gave Harvey no bond, note, or other obligation for the debt. In the summer of1895
Leslie sold the timber to Henry Thompson for $2500, who thereupon cut and
hauled it off. Harvey learned of the sale
of the timber only when half of it had been
cut off. He then consulted an attorney,
in regard to arresting the continuance of the
cutting, but, advised by him that he could
do nothing so long as his interest was paid,
he did nothing. The timber was all removed by July, 1896. In September, 1896,

THE FORUM.
Mr. Harvey began foreclosure proceedings.
and in Jan., 1897, the land was sold by the
sheriff on the levarifaci s for $3,000. This
is an action of trespass against Leslie to recover $2,000, the difference between the
mortgage debt and the price at which the
premises were sold by the sheriff.
The first question we encounter in deciding this controversy is, had Leslie, the
mortgagor in possession, the right, as
against the mortgagee, Harvey, to cut off
and sell, or to sell and authorize the vendee
to cut off, the timber. The timber, like
fixtures, is real estate, and, in a sense, is
a part of the land which is subject to the
mortgage. An important difference exists
however between the conception entertained by the courts of the mortgagor's
rights in respect to timber, ore, coal, etc.,
and that of his rights in respect to fixtures.
A wrong is in all cases done to the
mortgagee by removing fixtures.-Hoskin v. Woodward, 45 Pa. 42; Witmer's
Appeal, 45 Pa. 455 ; 1 Liens, 177 ; 3 Liens,
179. As respects timber, coal, etc., the
mortgagee seems to have a conditional
right to prevent their removal; that is, he
may prevent it if lie dispossesses the mortgagor by ejectment or otherwise, or if he
invokes the prohibition of the court by estrepement or injunction.-Wright
v.
Himes, 7 Mont. 156; 3 Liens, 179; 1 Liens,
177. If he does none of these things, the
mortgagor may lawfully remove the timber, provided he does not do so with a
fraudulent purpose.
"May not," asks Lowrie, C. J., in Hoskin v. Woodward, 45 Pa. 42, "a mortgagor
sell in the usual way the lumber, firewood,
coal, ore, fruit, or grain found or growing
on the land without violating the rights of
the mortgagee? Yes, he may until the
mortgagee stops him by ejectment or estrepement, for those things are usually intended for consumption and sale, and the
sale of them is the usual means of raising
the money to pay the mortgage." The same
opinion is expressed by Woodward, J., in
Witmer's Appeal, 45 Pa. 455. In these
cases however what was said on this point
was obiter dictum. In Angier v. Agnew,
98 Pa. 587, three days before the mortgage
matured, the mortgagor sold all the timber on the premises. A year and a half
afterwards the purchaser entered on the
land, and cut and carried away the timber
without the knowledge of the mortgagee.

In an action of trespass on the case by the
mortgagee against the purchaser of the timber and his employees, the trial court directed a non-suit. In affirming this judgment, the supreme court, per Gordon, J.,
said that the purchaser had a right to buy
because the mortgagor had a right to sell.
"We may also add," says the opinion,
"that the use of these things," (lumber,
firewood, coal etc.), in the way thus spoken
of cannot be a fraudper se on the mortgagee
for he must know when he takes his security, that such articles will continue to be
subject to their ordinary use; indeed, as
was said on the case cited, they may offer
the only means which the debtor possesses
with which to pay the mortgage."
Whether Leslie was solvent or insolvent
when he sold the timber does not appear.
We might probably infer from the fact that
the mortgagee pursues him by the action of
trespass, that in the opinion of the former,
lie is not, or will not be, unable to respond
to any judgment that may be recovered
against him. There is no evidence that
the sale was for the purpose of lessening the
value of the mortgagee's security, or for
any other fraudulent purpose. That the
proceeds of the sale of the timber have not
been applied to the mortgage notwithstanding the insufficiency of the premises
to yield enough at the sheriffs sale to pay
the mortgage would not support the inference of any such fraudulent purpose.-98
Pa. 587, sup)ra.
Judgment of non-suit will therefore be
entered.

SAMUEL TRITT vs. ROBERT SENN,
Agency-mplied a.qency--_Facts sufficientfrom which to infer.
Action in Assumpsit.
FREDERICK B3. MOSER and JoHN H.
VINCENT, Jr., for plaintiff.

An agency may be inferred from continuous acts performed by an alleged agent
and the recognition of such acts by the
principal.-Catasauqua M'Pfg. Co. v. Roberts, 2 D. R. 392; Mlondorf v. Wickersham,
63 Pa. 87; The 0dorilla v. Baigley, 128 Pa.
283; M Niele v. Cridland, 168 Pa. 16; Fenner v..Lewis, 10 Johns. 38; Arnold v. Spurr.
130 Mlass. 347; Southern Life l::z. Co. v.
McCain, 96 U. S. 84.
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That Senn has a claim against Ward is
no defence to this action.-MeNair v. MeLennan, 24 Pa. 384; Catasauqua M'tfg. Co.
v. Roberts, supra; Ludwig v. Gorsuch, 15
Pa. 413; Hays v. Linn, 7 Watts 524; Sheffer v. Montgomery, 65 Pa. 329.
J. TrwiPsox CALDWELL and MARTrN
F. DUFFY for defendant.

An agency cannot be implied from the
mere fact that at sonze previous time such
a relation existed. -Central Pa. Tel. Co. v.

Thompson, 112 Pa. 118; B. & 0. R. R. Relief Asso. v. Post, 122 Pa. 579; Whiting v.
Lake, 91 Pa. 349; Hampton v. Matthews,
14 Pa. 105; Life Ins. Co. v. Shultz, 82 Pa.
46. In order that an agency may be inferred, it must affirmatively appear that
former transactions were closely enough
related to the transaction in question as
to induce a reasonable man, without notice,
that such agency still exists.
CHARGE OF COURT.

Gentlemen of th Jury:On the 2nd of June, 1896, John Ward, a
wine merchant in Harrisburg, ordered
from Tritt, in Philadelphia, 10 barrels of
whiskey and directed Tritt to ship them to
Senn in Carlisle. Ward had, on May 10,
1890, borrowed from Senn $:500, and Senn
had, in April, 1896, offered to take whiskey
to the value of $500 in payment. When,
on the 1st of July, 1896, Senn received the
bill of lading, he accepted the whisky
thinking it had been sent by Ward in conformity with the agreement of the preceding April, and that Ward had for himself,
bought it of Tritt. As Ward, however,
had been in the habit, as agent for Senn,
of buying liquors in Philadelphia, and he
had already on several occasions bought for
Senn, who had paid the bills, Tritt supposed that the present purchase of the
whiskey was made as Senn's agent. In
this assumpsit, Tritt seeks to recover $500,
the value of the whiskey.
As Tritt, the plaintiff, had no other dealings with respect to the sale of the whiskey
than those with Ward, his right to recover
from Senn depends on the actuality of an
agency for Senn in Ward, or on facts justificatory of Tritt's assumption of the actuality of such agency. Actual agency there
was none. Ward had consented to pay,
and Senn to receive payment of, his debt
to Senn in whiskey. The whiskey was
bought in fact by Ward for the purpose of
thus discharging his debt. This he could
not have done unless the whiskey became
his, and his it would not have become if it

had been purchased by him as the representative of Senn. As then there was no actual agency in Ward, did facts exist which,
as against Senn, justified Tritt in assuming Ward to be Senn's agent, and to sell
the whiskey to Senn through him?
No communication from Senn to Tritt
occurred. If Ward made representations
that lie was buying for Senn, they were
not only untrue, but they were absolutely
without authority. Tritt's warrant then,
for believing in the agency of Ward, consisted solely in the fact that on earlier occasions Ward had been Senn's agent in
purchasing liquors. The principle is unquestionable, that when A. has with B.'s
authority effected several transactions with
C. of a certain kind, C. may in the absence
of notice of the lapse of the agency, assume
its continuance when witliin a reasonable
period after the last transaction, A.
attempts another. But, C. would not be
justified in inferring from A's having had
an authority 5 or 4 or 3 years ago to purchase certain kinds of articles, that he has
it to-day. The evidence does not reveal
the length of time during which Ward was
in fact the agent of Senn, nor the number
of purchases made by him as such agent
during that time, nor the interval between
the lust of these authorized purchases and
the unauthorized one upon which the present action is founded. We think it would
be perilous to permit a jury to guess either
the continuance in fact of the agency or the
existence of a right in Tritt to believe in
the continuance of it from the circumstance
that in an anterior period, however remote
and however brief, an indeterminate number of purchases were made by Ward for
Senn with his authority. It would be very
unreasonable to allow one from whom on
two or three occasions A had bought goods
for X, merely for that reason to sell to A,
years afterwards, as the agent for X. The
continuance of such agency must not be inferred from its former existence, beyond a
probable period. It may be that Ward's
purchases for Senn with authority were
recent enough to justify Tritt in supposing
that authority to continue down to the
time of the last purchase. The plaintiff is
unfortunate in not having shown precisely
how recent such purchases were.
Had Tritt had legal reason to believe in
the agency of Ward for Senn, lie could have
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recovered the price of the whiskey sold to
Ward for Senn, whatever the relation between Ward and Senn. Even had the
whiskey never in fact reached Senn, without Tritt's default, he would have been liable for the price. le in fact received the
whiskey. The only result of compelling
him to pay for it would be to thrust on
him a purchase that he did not intend to
make, and to disappoint his hope of procuring a payment of his debt from Ward.
To such results he would have been subjected, had the evidence shown warrant
for Tritt's confidence that in selling to
Ward, he was selling to Senn.
Your verdict therefore, gentlemen of the
jury, must, for the reason stated, be for the
defendant.
SAMUEL MACAULEY vs. WVlLIAM
FINKENBINE.
Executor's sale-Power to sell not revoked by lapse of time named in'willTestator'sintention governs.
Ejectment.
JOHN EVERRT SmALL and GEO. B.
SmERVILLE for the plaintiff.
The authority to sell being merely a
naked power, that authority is impliedly
revoked by non-performance within time
specified, and the lands descend to heirsat-law.-Egerton v. Conklin, 25 Wend.
224; Allison v. Wilson, 13 S. & R.. 332;
Craig v: Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563; Loomis v.
McClintock, 10 Watts 274.
JOHN R. SMNITH and ROBERT W. IRVING
for the defendant.
Executor's failure to exercise power of
sale within a fixed period does not destroy
the power. Shalter's Appeal, 43 Pa. 83;
Fahnestock v. Fahnestock, 152 Pa. 56;
Hackett v. Milnor, 156 Pa. 1.
The testator's intention was that the
plaintiff should have no share in his estate.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Josiah Macauley, dying August 13, 1891,
by his will directed his executor to sell
"within five years after my death, but
not afterwards" his farm and to divide the
proceeds equally between his son John
and his daughter, Mrs. Margaret Fuller.
The executor advertised a public sale for
7th May, 1896. The highest bid being unsatisfactory, the sale was adjourned for
one month. For the same reason no sale

was then effected. At length, at a fourth
adjournment a sale was made for $4,327,
on August 9th, 1896. The purchase money
was paid and the deed delivered on Sept.
3, 1896. The money was divided equally
between John Macauley and Mrs.
Fuller. Samuel MKaeauley, a second son,
disputing the validity of the sale, brings
this ejeetment against the purchaser of
the land, William Finkenbine.
The plaintiff, one of three children of
the deceased, would be, as to the farm in
question, an heir, hnd as such entitled to
an undivided third of it, had there been
no devise of the land from him. This
third he will recover, in this ejectment,
unless there be such a devise.
Josiah M
facauley directs his executor to
sell, within five years after his death, but
not afterwards. It is contended that the
sale made by the executor, was not made
within the period limited, and from this
retardation, the conclusion is drawn that
such a sale is void. Is this conclusion correct? It is true, generally speaking that
in the execution of powers the intention
of the grantor or testator, as to the mode,
time and conditions of their execution,
must be observed. 18 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
Law, 038. If a sale is directed, to take
place after a certain period, or event, it has
been often held that a sale within that
period, or before that event, passes no
title. Thus, a sale by an executor during
the life of E. under a direction to sell
after the death of E. is void. Booraem v.
Wells, 19 N. J. Eq. 87; Egerton v. Conklin, 25 Wend. 224; Loomis v. McClintock,
10 V. 274. In Blacklow v. Laws, 2 Hare
40, the vice-chancellor thought the title
of the purchaser at such a sale so questionable that he ought not to be compelled to
pay for it, by a decree for specific performance. In Richardson v. Sharpe, 29 Barb.
222, the Supreme Court of New York refused to compel a vendee to accept land
sold to him after the expiration of seven
years from the testator's death, under a
testamentary power to sell within seven
years.
In Shalter's Appeal, 43 Pa. 83, the Supreme Court of this state refused to hold
a limitation of time within which a sale
was directed to be made, other than "directory." The decedent directed his executors to sell land so soon after his de-
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TIMOTHY ALBRIGHT vs. WESTERN
cease as might seem best, in their discreR R. CO.
tion so that it be "done within one year
after my decease." Ofasale made fouryears
after the testator's death, by the adminis.Bailroad-Sale of ticket-Contracttrator c. t. a., Reed J., remarks, he "unto run trahns-Injuaries
chedulc-.Failure
doubtedly had the power to sell, although
cause-Damages.
mote
the year had expired, for that was only
directory and not a condition precedent."
A power to sell within two, or if necessary,
Action in Assumpsit.
four years, was not destroyed but survived
E. H. HoFFmN and EDWIN S. LIvINthe executor's failure to exercise it within
GOOD for plaintiff.
the four years. Fahnestock v. FahueThe sale of a ticket makes a contract
stock, 152 Pa. 56.
and the railroad company is bound to furThe phrase "but not afterwards" in
nish all trains Is per advertised schedule,
Josiah Macauley's will is a scarcely more unless prevented by the act of God or the
v. N. Y., etc., R.
emphatic restriction of the power to sell public enemy.-People
. Co., 28 Hun. 543; Chicago h. R. Co.
than the limitary expression in Shalter's
v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Gordon v. R. R., 52
Appeal. We think it is precatory, hor- N. H. 596; Isaaeson v. N. Y. C. R. R., 94
N. Y. 278; Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v.
tatory, or directory, and that it does not
Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. .519.
condition the exercise of the power.
The act of God cannot be set up as a
The testator's intention evidently was defence,
the blizzard not affecting the
to direct a sale, for the benefit of his son
track of the train in question.-P. & R.
John and his daughter. To them he gives R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 356; B. &
0. R. R. v. School District, 96 Pa. 65.
the entire proceeds. They were owners in
The breach of the contract by the comequity of the farm. They could have paiy was the immediate cause of the inelected to take it in specie, and in that juries sustained, and it is therefore liable.
way superseded the testator's power to -Balto., etc., .R. R. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md.
(U.
sell. They have ratified the retarded sale, 74; Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 353;
5.) 44; P. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa.
by accepting the purchase money. Had Andred v. Christie, I Forum 43; Pittsthe sale taken place a few days earlier, burgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. 54; R. R. Co. v.
Samuel Macauley would have had no Hope, 80 Pa. 1; Higgins v. Dewey, 107
estate in the land or in the proceeds of it. Mass. 494.
M LES H. Muna and CLEoN N. BERNIt was hardly the intention of his father
that he should acquire an undivided third THEIZEL for defendant.
A railroad company is not liable for
in it, and his brother and sister lose each
want of punctuality or failure to comply
an undivided sixth, should the sale not
with the schedule, which is not due to its
be effected within five years.
negligence. It is not liable for injuries
resulting from unforeseen accidents or misAs we are of opinion that the power to
v. Manchester, etc., R.
sell did not perish with the lapse of five fortunes.-Gordon
R. Co., 52 N. H. 596; Meier v. Penna. R.
should
that
we
it
is
unnecessary
years,
R. Co., 64 Pa. 225; Bowen v. N. Y., etc.,
determine whether the sale effected by the R. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 408; P. & R. R. R.
testator is to be regarded as occurring Co. v. Anderson, 94 Pa. 351; Livezey v.
64 Pa. 106.
within, or beyond that period; that is, Philadelphia,
The failure to run the train was not
or
sell
and
buy,
whether the contract to
the proximate cause of the sickness; the
the consummation of it, by delivery of the company was under no duty to contemplate the sickness as a probable result of
deed and payment of the price, is to be
regarded as the sale, in the sense of the its act, and is therefore not liable.-Hoag
v. R. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293; P. R. R. v. Hope,
testator. Fidler v. Lash, 125 Pa. 87 and 8 Pa. 373; P. R. R. v. Herr, 62 Pa. 353;
Wilkinson v. Buist 124 Pa. 253, are not Fairbanks v. Smith, 70 Pa. 86.
inconsistent with the conclusion we have
CHARGE OF COURT.
reached.
of the Jury:Gentlemen
non-suit.
Judgment of
The Western R. R. Co's. line connects
Hagerstown with Harrisburg. It carries
passengers between those and intermediate
points. It advertises by printed schedules
posted up, and otherwise, that it will run
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trains at certain hours. One of the periods
published for a train leaving Harrisburg
for Carlisle was 10:55 p. m. The Western
R. R. Co., also owns several branch roads,
one connecting Mechanicsburg and Dillsburg. This branch road became blocked
with snow, by reason of a severe blizzard,
and in the effort to open it, a wreck occurred on the night of February 7, 1894.
The engine destined to pull the train leaving Harrisburg at 10:55 p. m., was sent to
the Dillsburg branch, to assist in removing the wreck. Albright, who at Carlisle
had purchased a return trip ticket, and
had left that borough for Harrisburg the
same evening, intending to return on the
10:55 train, appeared at the station in Harrisburg in time to take the train. He then
ascertained on demanding the train that
it would not run because the engine necessary to pull it was elsewhere employed.
He was compelled to remain in Harrisburg over night, spending one dollar for
lodging. He was put in a room without
fire, caught a cold, had to employ a physician, to whom he paid three dollars. He
also lost time on account of his sickness,
and for this reason five dollars were deducted from his salary. rn this action,
Albright seeks to recover these sums.
The sale of a ticket makes a contract
between the railroad comipany and the
purchaser to transport him to the point
named in the ticket. Cheney v. Boston
etc., R. R. Co., 52 Mass. 121; Pollock, Contracts, 15, note. The ticket expresses,
however, only a portion of the contract.
The rules and regulations of the company,
Caldwell v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 8
Pa. C. C. 468; Dietrich v. Pennsylvania R.
R. Co., 71 Pa. 432; Lake Shore, etc., R. R.
Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519, and the
published time tables, are a part of it. The
company does not, it is true, unconditionally promise to run the trains at the times
published, but it does promise to run them
in as close accordance therewith, as it can
with reasonable diligence. Gordon v.
Manchester, etc., Railroad, 52 N. H. 596;
Le Blanche v. London, etc., Railway Co.,
1 U. P. Div. 286; 1 Wharton Contracts,
25; Denton v. G. N. Railway Co., 5 Ellis
& B. 860; Sears v. Eastern R. R. Co., 14
Allen 433. If, announcing that it runs a
train of a certain hour, from London to
Hull, it in fact runs no further than
Grimsby, and a passenger who has bought

the ticket for Hull, is obliged to stop at
Grimsby for the night, the contract is
broken, and he may recover his damages.
Hamlin v. Great Northern Railway Co., 1
H. & N. 408. So if the train announced
to stop at , station and take on passengers,
in fact passes it without stop, whereby one
who has bought a ticket for passage from
that station is disappointed, he may recover damages for the breach of the contract, unless some lawful excuse existed
for the failure of the train to stop. Gordon
v. Manchester, etc., Railroad, 52 X. H.
596. If with a ticket the passenger presents himself at the station to take a train
advertised to start at 9:30 p. m., and the
train is delayed for one hour and forty-five
minutes, the company is actionable. 14
Allen, 433.
The Western R. R. Co., was then under
obligation to furnish passage to Albright
at 10:55 p. m. Do any facts appear which
qualify this obligation? A heavy snow
had fallen on a branch road. A wreck
had resulted from the effort to clear this
road. The engine destined to draw the
train on which Albright was intending, to
ride, was detached and sent to the wreck.
What was the nature of this wreck? Was
the clearing of the track so exigent, that
it must be done, even at the cost and inconvenience of disappointed passengers?
Was the supply of engines so limited, that
the diversion of this one was reasonably
unavoidable? We are left wholly in the
dark upon this matter. -Primafacie, the
duty is on the railroad company to haul
its passengers, by trains running on the
published times. The burden is upon it,
of showing the excusatory facts. In Le
Blanche v. London, etc., Railroad Co., 1
C. P. Div. 286, it is said that a delay of 15
minutes would impose on the company
the duty of explanation. We find nothing in what it has shown that would
constitute an excuse. The plaintiff then
would in every case be entitled to nominal
damages.
Hamlin v. Great Northern
Railway Co., 1 H. & N. 408.
We are now to consider what actual
damages are recoverable, if any, by the
plaintiff. It was late at night. No other
convenient communication with Carlisle
was at hand, at least none the use of which
would in all likelihood not have cost more
than the expense of a sojourn in Harrisburg. A delayed passenger may employ a
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horse and buggy, Sears v. Eastern Railroad, 14 Allen 433, but may not resort to
extraordinary expense, in order to reach
his destination, and charge such expense
as damages upon the railroad company.
Le Blanche v. London, etc., Railway Co.,
1 C. P. Div. 286. Albright did right, in
betaking himself to a hotel for the night,
and he is entitled to reimbursement for
what he paid on this account. Hamlinv.
Great Northern Railway Co., 1 H. & N.
408.
In the fireless room of the hotel, Albright took a cold, which compelled him
to spend three dollars in procuring the
attendance of a physician, and to suffer a deduction of five dollars from his
salary on account of lost time. Is the defendant liable for these expenses? The
rule is, that on a breach of contract the
defendant is liable only for such of the
consequences of the breach as are natural
and probable, and not occasioned by some
distinct intervening agency acting in conjunction with the breach. Billmeyer v.
Wagner, 91 Pa. 92; West M4ahanoy v.
Watson, 112 Pa. 574; 116 Pa. 344; Hoag v.
Lake Shore, etc., Railroad Co., 85 Pa. 293;
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa.
353; Passenger Railway Co. v. Frick, 117
Pa. 390. This rule is not, nor could any
rule for such a purpose be, scientifically
precise and the results of the effort to apply it in many cases, are inconsistent and
irreconcilable. We are unable to think
that it would accord with this rule to allow a recovery for the consequences of Albright's sickness. That Albright should
go to a hotel to spend the night, was not an
improbable or singular consequence of the
refusal of the defendant to carry him to
his home. But was it to be expected that
the room taken by him would be too cold
or that as a result, he would become sick?
Could Albright not have procured a
warmer room, had he asked for it? We
cannot see that the exposure to the risk of
taking cold was unavoidable, nor that,
even if unavoidable under the actual circumstances, the railroad company was
under a duty to contemplate it as a
likely result of its own act. In Hobbs v.
London, etc., Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q., B.
111, A, his wife and two children, riding
on a train, were set olt at the wrong station, five miles from their destination, late
at night. No conveyance nor inn accom-

modation could be had. They therefore
walked home through a rain. The wife
caught cold and medical attendance had
to be procured. The jury found that
the plaintiff was entitled as damages, to
£8 for inconvenience, and £20 for the
expenses 'consequent upon the wife's
illness. V'hat great judge Cockburn, C.
J., allowed the verdict to stand for
£8, but set it aside, as to the £20,
holding that that for which damages could
be obtained must be something " immediately connected with it (the breach of
the contract) and not merely connected
with it through a series of causes interven.
ing between the immediate consequence
of the breach of contract and the damage or injury complained of." This case
was.followed by Morton, C. J., in Murdock v. Boston, etc., Railroad Co., 133
Mass. 15. A passenger, whose ticket entitled him to be carried to N, was forcibly
ejected at an intermediate point by the
conductor, who was a railroad police officer, and for alleged evasion of his fare was
delivered by him to two police officers
who detained him during the night in a
damp cell. For the illness resulting from
this detention, the railroad company was
not responsible in an action for the breach
of the contract of carriage. Although in
Weed v. Panama Railroad Co., 17 N. Y.
362, damages for sickness to a passenger for
detaining him in a car all night in a
sickly region were recovered, the only
question considered by the court is the
liability of the company for the wilful
acts of its conductor.
It remains to consider whether the remoteness, the non-naturalness and nonprobableness of the consequence for which
damage is claimed, must be submitted to
the judgment of the jury, or may be pronounced by the court. The rule in this
state is that when the facts are disputed,
the jury must judge; but when the facts
are unquestionable, the court must decide.
Hoag v. Lake Shore, etc., Railroad Co.,
85 Pa. 293; West Mahanoy v. Watson, 112
Pa. 574; 116 Pa. 344; Passenger Railway
Co. v. Frick, 117 Pa. 390. In the exercise
of this prerogative, we instruct you, gentlemen of the jury, that your verdict
should be for the plaintiff for one dollar,
with interest from February 7, 1894.
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ESTATE OF AMOS SANDERSON,
DECEASED.
W1idozo's exempfion-Demand for apPraioewent-liabilitgof wife as joint maker, with husband, of a note.

Exceptions to Auditor's Report.
HARVEY S. KISEu and ALFRED JOEL
PRIGHT for exceptants.
1. The sale by the husband to his wife of
his intcrestin the furniture, etc., was fraudulent as to the creditors, and is therefore
void.-Marshall v. Roll, 139 Pa. 399; Benson v. Maxwell, 105 Pa. 274; Keeney v.
Good, 21 Pa. 349. There being therefore
personalty belonging to the estate, the wid-ow's exemption must be allowed out of
such. -- Scott's Estate, 2 Phila. 135; Rhone's
0. C. Practice, Vol. 1, 296, 31.
2. It does not appear that there was an
appraisement. The widow's exemption can
therefore not be allowed.-Davis' Appeal,
34 Pa. 256; Hufnan's Appeal, 81 Pa. 320;
Andress' Estate, 10 W. N. 0. 52.
JOSEPii F. BIDDLE and I. I. WINGEIT
for Auditor.
1. By theact of Apr. 14,1851, P. & L. 1524,
the widow may retain either real or personal property to the value of $300.
2. The widow's right to $300 exemption
is superior to the rights of all creditors, excepr a lien for purchase money of real
estate.-Compher v. Compiler, 25 Pa. 31;
Allentown's Appeal, 109 Pa. 75; Peeble's
Estate, 157 Pa. 60.5; Spencer's Appeal, 27
Pa. 218; Nottes' Appeal, 45 Pa. .361; Grave's
Estate, 134 Pa. 377; Davis' Estate, 1 Phila.
360.
3. The exemption allowed, even though
no demand was made by the widow for an
appraisement.-Act, supra; Thomas' Estate, 152 Pa. 63 ; Peeble's Estate, 157 Pa. 605.
4. The right is not dependent on the needs
of the widow. -Palethrop's Estate, 14 Pa.
C. 0. 51.
OPINION OF COURT.

Amos Sanderson and his wife, Julia, who
owned a separate estate, purchased jointly
of John Harrison, (who had declined to
sell to Amos alone,) household furniture,
chairs, carpets, tables, etc., at the price of
$724.19. For this sum the purchasers executed to Harrison a joint promissory note,
with a warrant of attorney to confess judgment. On the warrant, a judgment was
entered against both, and became alien on
a house owned by Amos Sanderson. A few
days later than the entry og this judgment,
Samuel Sibbett recovered a judgment
against Amos for $217.10. Six months
thereafter, Amos died, and two years after

his death, his administrator sold the house
for the payment of debts. The net proceeds
of the sale were $854.07. Before the administrator's application to the Orphans' Court
for leave to sell the house, Julia Sanderson
notified him that she demanded the $300
exemption as widow, and as debtor. There
was no personalty belonging to Amos, he
having sold all his interest in the above
mentioned household furniture to his wife.
The auditor awarded to Julia $300 from the
proceeds of the sale of the house, and to John
Harrison the balance, $554.07. To this report, Harrison and Sibbett except.
The sole question to be considered is,
whether Julia Sanderson is entitled to the
$300 exemption. The right to the exemption is conferred by the 5th section of the
act of April 14, 1851, 1 P. & L. 1524. The
widow "may retain any real or personal
property belonging to said (the husband's)
estate to the value of $300," "provided that
this section shall not affect or impair any
liens for the purchase money of such real
estate." The claim is therefore valid as
against creditors, whether they have a
judgment or not, and as against mechanics' liens and tax liens.-Allentown's Appeal, 109 Pa. 75; Peeble's Appeal.
157 Pa. 605; Spencer's Appeal, 27 Pa. 218.
Even as against a judgment for money
loaned to the husband in order that he
might pay for the land, as such judgment
is not for purchase money, the exemption
may be asserted.-Nottes' Appeal, 45 Pa.
361. On the theory that a mortgagee is a
purchaser, the courts have determined that
the widow's claim is not available against
mortgages.-Kauffman's Appeal, 112 Pa.
645 ; Nerpel's Appeal, 91 Pa. 336 ; Peeble's
Estate, 157 Pa. 605. The fact therefore that
Harrison and ,ibbett had liens on the
house does not preclude the-widow from
demanding $300 from its proceeds.
It has been said in behalf of the exceptants that the widow cannot have $300
worth of land set apart to her so long as
there is personalty sufficient to satisfy her
demand; and that the decedent's sale of
the personalty to his wife Julia being fraudulent as to creditors, he died possessed of
personal property, out of which the $300
must be taken. But (a) the act of 1851 declares that the widow may "retain either
real or personal proberty." She may take
part of the $300 out of personalty and part
out of realty. Even if the personalty ex-
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ceeds the $300, she may ignore it, and insist on the exemption of a portion of the
realty to the extent of $300.-Grave's Estate, 134 Pa. 377; Klein's Estate, 14 Pa. C.
0. 72. (b) There is no personalty. The
exceptants allege that the sale by Amos
Sanderson to his wife Julia of his interest
in the goods was fraudulent, and therefore
void, as respects creditors. Of the fraud of
that sale there is absolutely no evidence.
The husband sold, he did not give, he did
not feign to sell, the goods to his wife.
Does the liability of Julia Sanderson for
the debt to Harrison preclude her diverting
a portion of her co-debtor's property from
his claim? Is she indeed liable? By the
8th section of the act of April 11th, 1848, 2
P. & L. 2907, a wife, contracting a debt for
necessaries, could be sued jointly with the
husband, and if satisfaction of the judgment could not be procured from his property, a levy might be made upon hers.
Whether carpets, chairs, tables, etc., are
necessaries, it is unnecessary to decide.
They may be. But it has been held that,
under this act of 1848, the wife assumes no
liability by making a contract jointly with
her husband.-Berger v. Clark, 79 Pa. 340;
Parke v. Kleeber, 37 Pa. 251; Murray v.
Keyes, 35 Pa. 384. Harrison refusing to
sell the furniture to Sanderson alone, the
latter and his wife made the purchase and
they executed a joint promissory note for
the price. Being joint purchasers, therefore, Julia Sanderson would not have become at all liable under the act of 1848.
The contractualpowerof a married woman has been enlarged however by the act of
June 8th, 1893, 2 P. & L. 2887. By the 1st
section of that act, she has acquired "the
same right and power as an unmarried person to acquire, own, possess, etc., any property of any kind, real, personal or mixed,"
and by the 2nd section, she "may, in the
same manner, and to the same extent as
an unmarried person, make any contract
in writing or otherwise which is necessary,
appropriate, convenient or advantageous to
the exercise or enjoyment of the rights and
powers granted by the previous section."
A married woman then may "acquire"
personalty, and may make any contract
appropriate to such acquisition; i. e. she
may buy, and thus become a debtor for the
price. So it was held, under the act of
June 3rd, 1887, Adams v. Grey, 154 Pa. 258,
where a judgment on a warrant attached to

a note for household goods bought by a
married woman was sustained. Cf. Steffen v. Smith, 159 Pa. 207. The act of 1893
does not diminish, in this respect, the
rights and powers conferred by that of 1887.
Julia Sanderson therefore is jointly indebted to Harrison with her deceased husband.
May she then take the$300 as against Harrison? If she were claiming as an earlier
lien creditor, she could probably not diminish the fund to the disappointment of a
creditor in whose judgment she was a coOf. 2 Liens, 791. And possidefendant
bly she could not, as widow, diminish the
fund in a similar way but for the fact that
she would be entitled, even as debtor, to
demand the $300 against Harrison. These
$300 may, for aught that appears, be the
only property that she has. Were an execution levied on it, under Harrison's judgment against her, she could protect it by
her demand as debtor for the exemption of
$300 worth of property. She may therefore
take it in this proceeding.
Another objection to the allowance of
the $300 to the widow is that she failed to
demand an appraisement. She informed
the administrator that she desired the $300
out of the land before he applied to the
Orphans' Court for authority to sell it. As
the 5th section of the act of April 14, 1851,
1 P. & L. 1524 states that "it shall be the
duty of the executor or administrator * to
have the* said property appraised," we
think notification to him of the claim is
sufficient. Thomas' Estate, 152 Pa. 63;
Peeble's Estate, 157 Pa. 605. In the former
of these cases, the widow having denmanded the exempted property, but not an appraisement, and the administrator. having
caused no appraisement to be made, but
selling the land under the order of the Orphans' Court for the payment of debts, she
was allowed the $300 out of the proceeds.
In Davis' Appeal, 34 Pa. 2.56, "the right to
share in such proceds was denied to the
widow because she had had an appraisewent of some property not equal in value
to $300, and did not demand the residue
until after the application to the Orphans'
Court, and perhaps after advertising had
been done. In Hufnian's Appeal, 81 Pa.
328, the widow was one of the administrators, and therefore could have caused the
appraisement to be made. In Andress'
. C. 52, she was the sole
Estate, 10 W.
adininistratrix, and neglected to have the
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appraisement made. As we see no reason
for disallowing the widow's claim to the
$300, the exceptions to the auditor's report
are dismissed, and t lie report is confirmed.

WILLIAM JAMES vs. CARLISLE FIRE
ASSOCIATION.
Contractof Insurance-Conditionin policy aq to non-pa/gment of assessmentsWlhat constitutes a waiver of conditions.
Action in Assumpsit.
G. FitANK Wp-r7EL and W. LLOYD SNY)ER for plaintif:
The action of the Carlisle FireAssociation
iii compelling the payment of the assessment of April 1, 1896, and in sending notice
of another ilter assessment constitutes a
waiver by the association, and it is estopped froim asserting that the policy is
fortited.-Beeter v. Thomas, 4 Pa. C. C.
192: Lyconling Co. Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Schollenberger, 44 Pa. 2.59; Columbia Ins.
Co. v. Buckley, 83 Pa. 293; Boiniert v. Ins.
Co. 129 Pa. 558; Susquehanna Ins. Co. v.
Leavy, 136 Pa. 299; Highlands v. Lurgan
Ins. Co., 177 Pa. 566, Cumberland Valley
Mutual Protection Co. v. Mitchell, 48 Pa.
374; Lycoming Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stockbower, 26 Pa. 199; Susquehanna Ins. Co. v.
Elkins, 23 W. N. C. 396.
Non-payment of an assessment does not
absolutely extinguish a policy; it simply
suspends its protection during default.Washington Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Rosenberg fight Co., 84 Pa. 373; Crawford Co.
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 88 Pa. 230;
Lantz v. Vermont Ins. Co., 139 Pa. 546.
G. F. VONVINCKEL, Jr., and P. E. RADLE
for defendant.
At the time of the fire, the plaintiff was
in default and according to the contract of
insurance, the policy had become void.Washington Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rosenberg,
84 Pa. 373; Dilliber v. Knickerbocker Ins.
Co., 76 N. Y. 570; Prentice v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 483; May on Insurance, 583.
The subsetuent acts of the association do
not constitute a waiver of the default. Mutual Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Laury,
84 Pa. 43; Washington Tut. Ins. Co. v.
Rosenberger Light Co., supra; Diehl v.
Adams Co. Mutual Ins. Co., 58 Pa. 443;
Leonard v. Lebanon Mutual Ins. Co., 3 W.
N. C. 527.
OPINION OF COURT.
On January 1, 1895, William James obtained a policy of fire insurance for $5,000
from the Carlisle Fire Association (a mutual insurance company), paying a cash

premium. The policy provided for the
payment of assessments to be from time to
time made upon the memberis of the Association for the purpose of paying losses suffered by members. It further stipulated
that "if any assessment shall remain unpaid for 30 days after notice thereof, the
policy shall become void." After several
assessments had been made and paid by
James, lie received notice on April 1, 1896,
of another for the sum of $100. This assessment not being paid, suit for it was brought
by the Association, and judgment recovered. This judgment was paid in August,
1896. On August 30th, James received
notice of another assessment, and on the
night of the same 30th of August, a fire
consumed the insured buildings of James.
It this action he seeks to recover the loss,
$3,500.
The only defence made by the Fire Association is that thefire occurred when the
plaintiff was in default. He had been in
default. Did the default terminate the
contract? The provision for forfeiture is
made, it seems, for the benefit of the company. On the happening of the default,
it may declare the policy void. But it
need not do so. It may recognize the continuance of the policy, either by making
new assessments for losses occurring after
the default, or by proceeding to collect the
overdue assessment.-Humm el & Co.'s Appeal, 78 Pa. 320; Columbia Ins. Co. v.
Buckley, 83 Pa. 293; Susquehanna Ins. Co.
v. Leavy, 136 Pa. 499. As the assured continues liable for the losses that occurred
before the expiration of his policy, it may
be difficult to understand why the reception of payment of assessments for such
losses should be deemed a recognition by
the company of the continlance of the insurance relation.-Joliffe v. Madison Mut.
Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 111; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law, 84; but this difficulty does not seem
to have been felt by other courts.
During the period of the default, the policy is suspended. No liability would attach to the company for losses then occurring.-Columbia Ins. Co. v.- Buckley, 83
Pa. 293; Hummel & Co.-s Appeal, 78 Pa.
320; Crawford County Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Cochran, 88 Pa. 230. The subsequent receipt of the assessment revives the indemnity for the future.-Crawford County

Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 88 Pa. 230;
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Washington Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rosenberger, 84 Pa. 373. The judgment for the
assessment of April 1st, 1896, was paid in
August, 1896. The fire occurred on Aug.
30, 1896. Was the payment before or after
the fire? As James was in default, and
his right to recover depends on some act
of waiver by the defendant, we think the
burden is upon him if the efficacy of his
payment depends upon its anteriority to
the fire, to show this anteriority. 2 Biddle,
Ins. 416. That he has not done.
Let us suppose then that the payment
was after the fire. Then the fire occurred
when the policy was no protection to
James. Did the subsequent payment retroactively as well as prospectively revive
the policy? We think that the reception
of payment by the company, after the fire,
and with knowledge of the fire, of assessments that ought to have been paid before
the fire, will re stablish the right of the
assured to the indemnity. In Lycoming
County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schollenberger,
44 Pa. 2.59, the fire occurred in the morning.
Notice of it was sent to the company .immediately. In the evening, the assessment
in arrear was paid by the assured "to the
agent, and by him repQrted to the company
and retained by them without objection
that it had been paid out of time." The
receipt was a waiver of the forfeiture of the
policy, and the assured was permitted to
recover. In Farmers Ins. Co. v. Bowen,
40 Mich. 147, when the fire occurred, there
were overdue and unpaid assessments. Immediately thereafter, Bowen, the assured,
paid up the assessments to the local agent
of the company, "who received the amount
with knowledge of the loss, but forwarded
the inonev to the company without mentioning the fire." Some weeks, possibly
three after, the directors directed an order
to be drawn on the treasurer, in favor of
Bowen for the amount of his loss. The
former receipt of the assessment, followed
by this direction to pay the loss, was a
waiver of the forfeiture of the policy. In
the former of these cases, the company,
when it received the delayed assessment,
in the latter, when it resolved to pay the
loss, knew of the fire. There is no evidence
that the Carlisle Fire Association, when it
received the belated payment, had heard
of the fire. We do not think the receipt
of the assessment, in ignorance of the occurrence of the loss, could with any propriety

be interpreted to be the expression of a
purpose to be liable to pay the indemnity for it. The Association had a right
to collect the money without restoring the
suspended life of the policy. It will not be
supposed to have intended to assume a liability for $3,500 in the absence of rpore
distinct evidence of such an intention.
It remains to consider the effect of the
assessment of Aug. 30th. It does notappear
whether this assessment was for losses occurring before the default or after. If for
losses before, the assessment would not be
a waiver, 2 Biddle, Ins. 377. But, even if
for losses after, while such assessment was
a recognition by the company of the subsistence of the policy, it apparently did not
waive its right to allege the suspension of
the protection of the policy. In Crawford
County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 88 Pa.
230, it was held that though a fire occurred
less than 30 days after the last assessment,
there being default in the payment of the
next preceding assessment, made one year
before, no recovery for the loss was possible.
It does not clearly appear whether the second assessment was for losses arising since
the default, but the interval, viz., one year
between the assessments, suggests that it
was for such losses. James was in default.
This default was not waived by the receipt
of payment of the assessment of April 1st,
1896, nor by the notice of the next assessment of Aug. 30th, 1896. He is not therefore entitled to recover. Judgment for
defendant.

SARAH HARRIS vs. HENRY HAMLINE.
.Result of husband's labor and skill in
his wife's business-Vife's property not*
liable for husband's debts under Act of
1893.
Feigned issue.
BLAKE tRVIN and J. P. COsTELO fo1
the plaintiff.
Under the act of 1893, a married woman
may borrow money and purchase goods on
her own credit as if she were a feme sole,
and the proceeds of business conducted by
her belong to her, and cannot be seized
by her husbind's creditors.-Walter v.
Jones, 148 Pa. 589; Association v. Fritz,
152 Pa. 224; Adams v. Grey, 154 Pa. 2.58;
Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572; Campe v
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Horne, 158 Pa. 508; Steffen v. Smith, 159
Pa. 207; Gockler v. Miller, 162 Pa. 271;
Bollinger v. Gallagher, 170 Pa. 84.
The husband's skill and labor employed
in his wife's business does not make her
stock liable for his debts.-Holcomb v.
Bank. 92 Pa. 341; Troxell v. Stockbridge,
105 Pa. 405; Spering v. Laughlin, 113 Pa.
209;. Baxter v. Maxwell, 115 Pa. 469; Walter v. Jones, 148 Pa. 589.
WILLIS E. .MACiEY and CHAS. W,
HAMILTON for the defendant.
The effort here is not to protect her
separate earnings from the grasp of his
creditors,-for she had no such earnings,but rather .to appropriate his earnings to
her own use, and thus prevent their application to his debts.-Blum v. Ross, 116
Pa. 163; Keeney v. Good, 21 Pa. 355; Jack
v. Kintz, 177 Pa. 578.
The husband's assistance in his wife's
business is evidence proper for the jury to
consider in determining the good faith of
the wife's claim of property. -Spering v.
Laughlin, 113 Pa. 213.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

cise in any specific modes. She could get
this property by gift; she could buy it for
ready money or for other property. She
could buy it on credit giving a note, a
bond, a judgment, any security that an
unmarried person could give. She could
get it by any necessary or appropriate contract, says the act. Its terms are so
explicit that misinterpretation of them is
almost impossible.
The act of 1893 is a substitute for that
of June 3, 1887, and is of substantially the
same import. Prior to the act of 1887, it
was held that a purchase by a married
woman on her personal credit, and not on
the credit of her separate estate conferred
the ownership on the husband. Blum v.
Ross, 116 Pa. 167; Walker v. Jones, .148 Pa.
589; Campe v. Home, 158 Pa. 508. Under
that act, however, by a purchase on her
personal credit, she, and not the husband,
becomes the owner. Says Green, J., in
Campe v. Home, 158 Pa. 508, after re,y~skinr tfhat, hpfnrp, ths aat, of 1R7. it ia
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ife of John Harris,
woman could not buy property on credit
who was a cripple and without property,
unless she had a separate estate, "but it i, I
borrowed from a brother, on her note,
equally certain that it is not the law now.' S
the sum of $2,000.
With this money she
Since 1887, she can buy furniture, Adam ,
Gcem
ornre,
y
vinGe 154 Pa 2.
her
store
the
In
store.
opened a grocery
v. Grey, 154 Pa. 959; or horses, Gockler v
husband acted, without compensation, as
Miller, 162 Pa. 271, or store goods, Waltei
originally
clerk and salesman. The goods
bg wv.
Jones, 148 Pa. 589, on credit and they
bought, were sold, and with their prowill become, not her husband's, but hers.
ceeds, other goods bought, until nearly all
She may borrow money, and with it, buy
the stock was changed three or four times.
land, Latrobe, etc., Association v. Fritz,
On a judgment recovered by Henry Ham152 Pa. 224; Steffen v. Smith, 159 Pa. 207,
line, a creditor of the husband, a levy was
lineaed
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anmdto be John
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women the "same right and power as an
unmarried person, to acquire, own, etc.,
any property." The 2nd section of the
same act empowers her, as an unmarried
person, to " m ake any contract in writing or otherwise, which is necessargy, appropriate, convenient or advantageous to
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of the
rights The
andproperty
powers
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in the first
section.
in this case was grocer's stores.
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Harris under te ac ha ' tresae p
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to acquire and to own it, that she would
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store goods, Walter v. Jones, 148 Pa. 589,
purchased by her with the money borrowed, eir
be hers. The $2,000 procured
from her brother, were Sarah Harris'; the
oods bought by it, were hers. The price
obtained by the sale of them was hers. The
goods
hers. It
gosbuh bought by
ytithi* price
rc were
eehr.I
is quite clear then, that the articles levied
upon, on the execution of Henry Hamline,
we e ot hep p r y of isd b r, ut f
were not the property of his debtor, but of
is debtor's wife.
It is suggested, however, that John
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Harris acted as clerk and salesman gratuitously, and thus increased the property
of his wife, and that for this reason, that
property should be appropriated to the
payment of his debts. It is well settled
however, that when a wife conducts a
business with her own property, her employment in it of her husband's skill,
labor and time, does not expose the property to seizure for his debts. Baxter v.
Maxwell, 115 Pa. 469; Spering v. Laughlin, 113 Pa. 209; Walter v. Jones, 148 Pa.
589; Troxell v. Stockbridge, 105 Pa. 405;
Holcomb v. People's Savings Bank, 92 Pa.
341. If then, gentlemen of the jury, you
should find that the facts recited by us in
the commencement of this charge are established by the evidence, your verdict
should be for the plaintiff.

JOHN BRINTON vs. WILLIAM JACQUES.

ant.-Porter v. Patterson, 3 Pa. 229; Killian v. Preston, 4 W. & S. 14; Sergeant's
lExec. v. King, 30 Pa. 83.
EDMUND LOCKE RYAN and THOS. K.
LEIDY for the defendant.

The book entries, being lumping charges
are not admissible in evidence, and will
not entitle the plaintiff to judgment.Walton's Estate, 4 Kulp 487; Bumgardner v. Burnham, 10 W. IN. C. 445; Cl v.
Stewagon, 20 W. N. C. 21; Corr v. Sellers,
100 Pa. 170; Shields v. Garret, 5 IV. N. C.
120; Van Roden v. Campbell, 5 W. N. C.
126; Gray v. Dick, 8 W. N. C. 435.
OPINION OF THlE COURT.

With John Brinton, a grocer, Jacques
began an account on January 20, 1880,
which ran on continuously until January
1, 1896. On the latter day, Brinton rendered a bill for groceries sold during this
period showing a balance of $1,100. Some
of the items amounting to $150, were in
this

form :-"

To

merchandise

$6.75."

Other items, amounting to $200, were in
this form :-" To balance March 2d,
Action on book account-Effect of en- $3.45." This was explained to mean, that
tries "merchandise" and "balance"on certain days goods were bought, partial
Presumption of accuracyfrom,part pay- payment for them made, and the residue
ment-Statute of Limitations.
charged as "balance" in the account. The
items of "merchandise" and "balance"
represelit transactions later than DecemRule for new trial.
ber 1, 1889, at which date $700 was as
GEO. T. BROwN and PAUL H. PRICE shown by the account, due. Soon after
for the plaintiff.
the bill Was rendered, it was put into the
Part payment of the bill by the defendbands of an attorney for collection. Jacant is a sufficient acknowledgment and
ques paid this attorney $10 on it. For the
identification of the debt in order to take it
remainder this suit is brought.
out of the Statute of Limitations. Morgan
v. Walton, 14 Pa. 321; Sun v. Burr, 26 Pa.
Brinton's claim rests (1) on the book ac284; Shaffer v. Shaffbr, 41 Pa. 51; Bar- count; or (2) on the testimony of a witness
clay's Appeal, 64 Pa. 69; Kunkel v. Iolb,
of whom the account is an instrument
6 V. N. C. 48.
for refreshing the memory; or t3) on the
Payment to attorney of plaintiff is a
valid payment and is an admission of the
alleged admission of the correctness of the
accuracy of the accou nt.-Tassey v. Church,
account by the defendant.
4 W. & 8. 141; Darlington v. Taylor, 3 Gr.
The book account so far as it is 'com195; Bevan v. Cullen, 7 Pa. 281; Thompposed of "balances," and "merchandise,"
son v. Fisher, 13 Pa. 310; Wesner v. Greenawalt 97 Pa. 322; Ahi's Appeal, 129 Pa. 26;
is not evidence of a debt. The former
Reading Trust Co. v. Reading Iron Co.,
do not charge any thing else than money,
137 Pa. 282.
and money charges are not proper comAlthough the accounts, "To
mdse.
ponents of a book account. Both the
$6.75" and" To balance March 2nd, $3.45"
are lumping charges, the book is admis"balance" and the " merchandise" items,
sible to refresh the memory of the plainfail reasonably to specify the articles purtiff as to the amounts and dates, and tochased, and they are also lumping. For
gether with the testimony explanatory of
this reason, they are not legitimate elethe composition of the same, constitute
sufficient evidence to go to the jury.-Bar- ments in a book account. Bumgardner v.
net v. Steinbach, 1 W. N. C. 335; Nichols
Burnham, 10 W. N. C. 445; Corr v. Selv. Haynes, 78 Pa. 174.
lers, 100 Pa. 170. But the inclusion of
Failure to make objections within a
illegitimate entries in a book account,
reasonable time will cause the bill to be
prima facie evidence against the defend- vitiates it, not wholly, but only pro tanto-
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Bumgardner v. Burnham, supra. The
debt, in so far as it rests on the transactions
not represented by these objectionable
items i. e. to the amount of $700, is then
sufficiently established by the book account.
Are the "balance "1and 'merchandise"
items saved by the concomitant testimony? The competency of the book account, inadmissible per se, to be received,
if supported by the evidence of a living
witness whose memory is refreshed by it,
is not disputable. Barret v. 'Steinbach, 1
W. N. C. 335; Henry v. Maitin, 1 W. N.
C. 277. The witness testifies that on certain days goods were bought, of whose price
all was simultaneously paid except the
sums entered on the account as "balancei'."
If this testimony were credited by the
jury, it would require the conclusion that
the defendant is debtor to the amount of
these "balances" in addition to the debt
shown by the unimpeached portions of
the account. No testimony however,
complements the entries styled "merchandise."
The conduct of the defendant with respect to the bill rendered, is said to be an
admission by him of the accuracy of the
bill. The bill was sent to him. Shortly
afterwards, not being paid, the claim was
left with an attorney for collection when
Jacques thereupon paid $10. The retention
of an account, sent to a debtor, by the
creditor for a time, (variable in length according to the nature of the account, the
relation of the parties, their distance from
each other, etc.,) without objection, is
treated as an admission of the accuracy of
the account. The act of sending it is a
challenge to the one to whom it is sent, to
object if he thinks it incorrect. Recognitions of this principle are very numerous.
Bevan v. Cullen, 7 Pa. 281; Thompson v.
Fisher, 13 Pa. 310; Tassey v. Church, 4
W. & S. 141; Reading Trust Co. v. Reading Iron Works, 137 Pa. 282; Darlington
v. Taylor, 3 Gr. 195; Samson v. Freedman,
102 N. Y. 699; Wiggins v. Burkham, 10
Wall. 129; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 334.
In Ahl's Appeal, 129 Pa. 26, the principle
is recognized, but with the qualification
that the person to be charged with the account must have the means of knowing
whether it is correct. The evidence, however, fails to show how long Jacques had

received the bill before he signified his dissent from it. From the mere retention of
it, therefore, his assent to it could not be
legitimately inferred.
But besides express assent to the veraciousness of a bill, assent may be displayed
by conduct. Drawing on an agent for the
exact balance shown by the account of the
latter; e. g. $5623.41, is an emphatic acceptance of the account. Lockwood v.
Thorne, 11 N. Y. 170. The debtors giving
a due bill for the balance, is equally explicit. Mackay v. Kahn, 44 N. Y. 286;
Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300. Sending,
on receipt of a bill showing a balance due
the sender, £5, and promising to pay the
remainder next week, will turn the account into an account stated. Peacock v.
Harris, 10 East 107. In Pinchon v. Chilcott, 3 C. & P. 236, A said to B, "you owe
me £3," for turnips already taken by B,
from A's ground under a contract. B's reply, "I will send it (i. e. the £3) before I
draw any more turnips" could be declared
on as an account stated.
Jacques had a copy of Brinton's bill. A
copy of it was also in Brinton's attorney's
hands. On receiving a monition from the
latter to pay it he calls, does not object to the
bill (quod non apparetnon est) butpays $10
on it. "There can," says Sharwood, J.,
"be no more unequivocal acknowledgment
of a present existing debt, than a payment
on account of it." Barclay's Appeal, 64
Pa. 69. "Payment implies the admission
of liability," Jessel, M. R. Harlock v.
Ashberry, 19 Ch. Div. 539. Payment
"operates as an acknowledgment of the
continued existence of the demand"
Cooley, C. J., Miner v. Lorman, 56 Mich.
212. Law of Limitations, 351 et seq. We
think the book account, and the correspondent bill, coupled with the significant
act of Jacques of making a partial payment on it, when summoned by the attorney to pay it, sufficient to justify a finding
that the bill represented an actual debt.
The action was brought one year after
the conclusion of the account on which it
is founded; and that account extends over
a period of sixteen years. The account
is neither a merchant's nor mutual account, and the statute oflimitations would,
if not tolled in some way, bar all its elements except those of the last five years.
The statute is tolled, only by a promise to

THE FORUM.
pay, or by an acknowledgment, in word
or act, which implies a promise to pay, the"
debt. Of what debt the payment is thus
promised, expressly or impliedly, must
distinctly appear. Law of Limitations,
324 et seq, 354. If the $10 had been paid
on account of some debt whose nature and
amount were unascertained, it could not
be regarded as importing a promise to pay
the residue of any particular debt. But
the debt was sufficiently identified. It
was a book account. A copy of it had
been rendered as a bill to Jacques. Another copy was in the posgession of the attorney. Demand was made by the latter
for paymeilt, and the payment of $10 immediately followed. No circumstances
are shown, that might avert the inferences
legitimately to be drawn from this conduct of Jacques. If he disputed the bill,
the occasion called on him to declare his
objection. Instead of objecting, he made
a payment on account. Cf. McClelland
v. West, 70 Pa. 183; Law of Limitations,
335, 336, 337. In Stewart's Appeal, 105
Pa. 307, it is said by Gordon, J., by way
of dictum, that if a debtor was fully informed of the condition and extent of the
account against him, and had made a
payment on it, the act might have been
such an acknowledgment as would toll
the statute. We think the payment of
$10 by Jacques an acknowledgment of the
debt manifested by the bill on a summons
to discharge which, by the attorney, be
made the payment. To this conclusion,
no hostile inference can be drawn from
Verrier v. Guillon, 97 Pa. 63. The account
there rendered was disputed by the debtor. No acknowledgment of its accuracy,
no partial payment was made. More than
six years had intervened between the
rendering of the account and the commencement of the action.
A payment, appropriated by the creditor
to a portion of a debt that is barred, [and
he can make such appropriation, Maloney
v. Bartlett, 37 W. N. C. 433,] will not, it
is true, toll the statute as to the remainder of the debt. Roylston v. May, 71 Ala.
398; Blake v. Sawyer, 83 Me. 129. Brinton's entire claim was exhibited in one
account; and the $10 were paid in answer
to a demand for the payment of the entire bill. The evidence then, warranted
the verdict of the jury, and the rule for a
new trial is discharged.

WILLIS ORRIS vs PETER GRAMAN.
Liability of owner of ferocious animalBights of licenree-Effect of direct, extraordinaryand unusual consequences of injury-Measure of damages.
Action in Trespass.
HARRY M. PERSING and EDwIN G.
HuTcHiNsoN for the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was a bare licensee.-Bigelow Torts, 224.
The defendant is liable to plaintiff for
injuries from his animal, knowing the ferocious character of the dog.-Sylvester v.
Maag, 155 Pa. 225; Snyder v. Patterson, 161
Pa. 98 ; Bucley v. Leonard, 4 Denio, 500;
Spring Co. v. E dgar, 99 U. S. 645; Mann
v. Weiand, 81 * Pa. 243; Act April 14, 1851,
1 P. & L. 1655,
11. Even though the
plaintiff was a trespasser.- Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 497; Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bing.
628 ; Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44.
The amount of damages is a question for
thejury.-Scott Township v. Montgomery,
95 Pa. 444 ; P. & 0. Canal Co. v. Gralam,
63 Pa. 290.
FRANCIS LAFFERTY and PAUL J.
SCHMIDT for the defendant.
The plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence; hence cannot recover.-D. L.
Cri.
R. R. Co. v. Codow, 120 Pa. 559;
Curtis v. Mills, 24 Eng. C. L. 670; Robb v.
Connellsville, 137 Pa. 42.
The opening of the old wound was not
the immediate result of the dog's attack.
The attack was a remote, not proximate
cause.-Hoag v. L. S. & Al. S. R. R., 85
Pa. 293; Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164; Schaeffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249.
If there can be a recovery, damages
must be limited to cost of physician and
nurse's charges.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

On January 24, 1895, Willis Orris was
walking along the pavement in front of
Graman's house when a gust of wind blew
his hat over the fence into his yard. Orris
opened the gate and entered the yard in
order to recover his hat, when a dog belonging to Graman, and kept by him on the
premises, and known by him to be ferocious, ran at Orris and bit him on the hand.
The wound thus made healed in two days,
but the fear and excitement occasioned by
the onset of the animal, and the consequent
spasmodic and uncalculated movements
caused an old wound, healed for two years
past, to open. Orris was compelled to secure the services of a physician and nurse,
costing $300. The re-opening of the wound

THE FORUM.
will shorten Orris' life and has permanently disabled him from work. Orris claims
$15,000.
Had the ferocity of the dog not been
known, Graman would not be liable for
the consequences of its attack on Orris.Quiltie v. Battie, 17 L. R. A. 521; Rider v.
White, 65 N. Y. 54; Conway v. Grant, 14
L. R: A. 196. Knowledge is postulated as
the ground of liability in Sylvester v. Maag,
155 Pa. 225; Snyder v. Patterson, 161 Pa.
98; Mann v. Weiand, 8112 Pa. 243. The
character of the dog, however, was known
by Graman.
For the assault of a dog, thus known to
be vicious, he who keeps it is liable to one
on whom it makes all attack, although
upon the premises. Tile attacked person
may be on the premises by right or license.
Sylvester v. Maag, 155 Pa. 22.5; Buckley v.
Leonard, 4 flenio, 500; Brock v. Copeland.
1 Esp. 203; Curtis v. Mills, 5 C. & P. 489.
But, the liability will exist although the
injured person is a trespasser.-Marble v.
Ross, 124 Mass. 44; Carroll v Staten Island
R. Co. 58 N. Y. 136. He was, e. g., a boy,
hunting without right on the premises of
the defendant, Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend.
496; a man gathering berries, Sherfey v.
Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58'; a peddler, entering
without permission for the purpose of selling his wares, Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn.
121; an artisan going on the land in search
of work (if he be indeed a trespasser), Conway v. Grant, 14 L. R. A. 196; a policeman
looking for a vicious character, Melseheimer v. Sullivan, 14 L. R. A. 196. Orris was
not a trespasser when he endeavored to recover his hat, Bigelow Torts. 224, but had
he been, his right to redress would not be
impaired.
Orris' recovery has been contested on the
ground of contributory negligence. It is
so trite a principle that the negligence of
the plaintiff, if contributory to the damage
will preclude his obtaining compensation
for it. that it is wholly superfluous to cite
authorities in vindication of it. We are
unable to discover any contributory negligence.
It remains to determine for what injuries
Orris can secure compensation. The owner of a ferocious dog must contemplate as
the probable result of harboring him, that
he will attack persons who pass near or
come upon'the premises. He must contemplate, as a likely consequence of the

attack, hurt to the body of the attacked
party. He must contemlIlate, as a consequence of this hurt, the employment of a
surgeon and a nurse. For the expenses of
medical attendanCe, and of the ministrations of a nurse, Graman is therefore liable.
2 Sedgwick, Damages, ? 483.
But the nature and severity of the results
of the attack may vary infinitely. Some
are ordinary and usual; others may be
deemed quite unusual. Some depend on
the peculiar and altogether rare predispositions of the body of the injured person.
If they are, ho%'ever, the consequences of
the attack of the dog, the attacked person
will have a right to compensation for all of
them. For a cancer developed on the breast
of a passenger, by his striking something
in consequence of a jerk, caused by the
sudden stopping of the car, the railroad
company was liable.-Baltimore City Passenger Railway Co. v. Kemp, 61 Mld. 74.
So it was for a hernia caused in a scuffle
with a passenger, in the attempt to eject
him-Coleman v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co., 106
Mass. 160. In Terre Haute, etc. R. R. Co.
v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, a passenger, in getting from a train, was hurt. The pain and
nervous shock predisposed him to take
typho-malarial fever; from this fever, hemorrhage of the bowels and death resulted.
The defendant was answerable for these
consequences. For insanity resulting from
a blow from a stick thrown from a car by
a brakeman upon the head of the plaintiff,
the company was liable.-effersonville,
f.
etc., R. R. Co. v. Riley, 39 Ind. 568.
Ticev. Munn, 94N. Y. 621; Louisville, etc.,
Railway Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind.409; Stewart v. City of Ripon, 38Wis. 584. Says Mr.
Sedgwick, "A common case of directly ensuing loss is where a physical injury stimulates a pre6xisting tendency to disease,
or leads to peculiarly unfortunate results,
owing to a prior injury, or to a delicate
state of health, or peculiar physical condition, such as pregnancy. In all these cases
the loss is the direct, though unexpected
consequence of the injury', and the plaintiff
may recover compensation for ft.'1IDamages, 5112.
The bite of the dog was no more to be
anticipated by his owner than the excitement and struggle to escape him. For the
consequences of that struggle, no less than
for those of the bite, Graman is properly
liable. In Sheffer v. Railroad Co. 105 U.
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S.,252, cited by counsel for defendant, the
company was held not to be liable for the
self destruction of the injured person, inflicted in consequence of the insanity that
supervened upon the accident. The opinion gives little evidence of deliberation.
But, the materials have not been furnished
us for determining what damages, beyond
the physician's and nurse's bills, have been
suffered. What is the plaintiff's probable
longevity? Is he old or is he young? What
was his earning power prior to the accident? Was it much or was it little? The
jury cannot be suffered wholly to conjecture the magnitude of the damages suffered. We are of opinion therefore, gentlemen of the jury, that you should allow
$300, the sum shown by Orris to have been
expended by him, and nothing further.

Against public policy. Washington Township v. Shoop, 2 D. R. 639; Frick v. Conradvs Exec'r., 154 Pa. 330; Commonwealth
v. Comm'r's. 2 S. &. R. 195.
Plaintiff cannot recover wages for minor
sons.-Coxe's Case, etc., supra.
One supervisor cannot bind township
for the performance of a contract for materials. The assent and action of bothare
required.-Cooper & Grove v. Lampeter
Township, 8 W. '125; Somerset Township
v. Parsons, 105 Pa. 360; Union Township
v. Gibboney, 94 Pa. 534.
Plaintiff cannot .recover because procedure is irregular. There was no appeal from
auditor's report. -Act April 15, 1834, 2 P.
& L. 4689; Northumberland County v.
Bloom, 3 W. & S. 542; Northampton
County v. Yoke, 24 Pa. 305; Brown v.
White Deer Township, 27 Pa. 109; Dyer
v. Covington Township, 28 Pa. 186; Blackmore v. Allegheny County, 51 Pa. 160;
Northampton County v. Herman, 119 Pa.
373,
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Clarence Day, a supervisor of Newton
CLARENCE DAY vs. TOWNSHIP OF
township,
agreed with his fellow, superNEWTON.
visor, on a division of the township, each
taking control of the roads in the half alAct of March 31, 1860, not applicable to lotted to him. Day, without consulting
township supervisors-Supervisors not en- his associate, purchased materials, for the
titled to compensationforuse of his wagon price of $100, for use on his roads. Payment of this order to the vendors was re- Wages due minor sons of supervisornot
allowed-Contract by one supervisorfor fused. He used his own wagon 100 days,
materials valid-Appcalfrom auditor's and demanded compensation at the rate
reportmust precede an action on claim. of $1.00 per day. He employed two of his
minor children fok ten days, and asked for
compensation at the rate of $1.00 per day.
GEORGE W. BENEDICT, JR., and H. The township auditors having refused
FRANKLIN KANTNER for the plaintiff.
him credit for these various sums, amountThe Act of March 31, 1860, is inappli- ing to $220, lie sues the township in the
cable.-Anderson's Appeal, 9 C. C. 667; common pleas for that sum.
Washington Township v. Shoop, 2 D.'R.
The first objection to the recovery of
639; Funk v. Washington Township, 13
Day is, that the purchase of materials,
C. C. 385.
The plaintiff is entitled to a recovery of
and the hiring of wagons and of laborers
$100, for the use of his wagon.-Anderfor road repair, are so far discretionary
son's Appeal, 9 C. C. 567.
A supervisor may employ his minor that the concurrence of the two supervisors therein is necessary. But the custom
sons in the repair of the public roads, and
is entitled to.a credit for all monies paid
of supervisors to allot to each of themselves
to such minors.-Washington Township
a portion of the township, and to assume
v. Shoop, 2 D. R. 639; Funk v. Washington
exclusive control over the repair of the
Township, 13 C. C. 3&5.
roads in the portion thus allotted, is invetA supervisor is entitled tQ a credit for
materials purchased without consultation
erate, and its legality has been often recogwith his associate. Sheppard v. Township,
nized by the courts. Contracts made by
4 Del. 385; Tribkett Road Law, p. 289.
each supervisor in respect to the making or
HARVEY E. Krurp and SibioN P.
repair of roads in his district are valid
NORTHRUP for the defendant.
Pennsylvania Road Law, 298. The abPlaintiff cannot recover for use of his
sence of the coiperation of Day's colleague,
wagon. (1) Under Act of March 31, 1860.therefore, in the making of the contracts of
Coxe's Case, 11 C. C. 639; In Be Hazel
Township 1 D R. 813; Borough of Mil- purchase and hire, is no barrier to his reford v. Milford Water Co., 124 a. 623. (2)
covery. No other objection has been made
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to the claim for $100 for road material, for
which the supervisor has paid.
To the recovery for the use of Day's
wagon and for the vages of his minor
children, are opposed, (a,' the 66 section of
the act of March 31, 1860, 1 P. & L, 1309;
and (b) the policy which forbids a trustee
or quasi-trustee from selling to himself as
such, what he personally owns.
The Act of March 31, 1860, directs "nor
shall any member of any corporation or
public institution, or any officer or agent
thereof, be in anywise interested in any
contract for the sale or furnishing of any
supplies or materials to be'furnished to or
for the use of any corporation, municipality or public institution, of which he shall
be a member or officer, or for which he
shall be an agent, nor directly nor indirectly interested therein, nor receive any
reward or gratuity from any person interested in such contract or sale." It also
makes the violation of this prohibition a
misdemeanor, penalizing it by a fine.
In Coxe's Case, 11 Pa. C. C. 639, and in
In Be Hazel Township, 1 D. R. 813,
Woodward, J., was of the opinion that
supervisors are within the scope of this
act, and are precluded by it from recovering for the use of their own team, and for
the employment of their minor children.
On the other hand, Futhey, J., in Anderson's Appeal, 9 Pa. C. C. 567, and Stewart,
J., in Washington Township v. Shoop, 2
D. R. 639; (S. C. Funk v. Washington
Township, 13 Pa. C. C. 385,) doubted the
applicability of the act to supervisors. We
think the able discussion of Judge Stewart
a sufficient vindication of his view. If
the act did embrace supervisors, we cannot share the doubt of Futhey, J.,
whether it would prevent their recovering
from the township for their horses ana
carts, Anderson's Appeal, supra. But see
opinion by Furst, JY., in Commonwealth
v. Hilibish, 12 Pa. C. C. 2-5. A contract
penalized by the act of 1860, is "utterly
void, and there is no power that can
breath life into such a dead thing." Paxson, J., in Milford Borough v. Milford
Water Co., 124 Pa. 610. That the contract,
between the supervisor and the township
sought to be enforced, is not an express,
but merely an implied one, while avoiding
some, does not avoid all, the mischief
which the act of 1860 intended to make
impossible.
Is Day's recovery precluded by public
policy? Although to this question a. negative answer is impliedly made by Futhey,
J., in Anderson's Appeal, 9 Pa. C. C. 569,
we again find ourselves in accord with
Washington Township v. Shoop, 2 D. R.
639 in giviijg to it an affirmative answer.
The supervisor allowed to employ his own
team would be less critical in s4electing it
among all available teams, less exacting in
regard to the amount of time per day dur-

ing which it should be at the service of the
township, and as to the diligence of its teamster. He would have a motive not to look
out for teams to be had at a less -rate than
that which he purposed to charge. The
wages of the minor children belong to the
father and-we cannot assume, in the absence
of evidence, that he had renounced to them
the right. He would be influenced to em-"
ploy his sons instead of others who for the
same price might render more efficient service, or the same degree of service at a les
price. We cannot assume, as the court
assumed in Washington Township v.
Shoop, that the wages had been paid by
the supervisor to his minor sons. We
know simpl.y that Day employed two of
his minor children for ten days "and made
a charge of $1.00 per day each." Day can
reco%er nothing for the use of his teams or
for the labor of his sons.
It remains to consider the procedure resorted to by Day to compel the payment of
his demand. He presented his account before the township auditors, and they refused to allow the $220. He did not appeal
to the common pleas, but commenced an
action in that court. The act of April 15,
1834, 2 P. & L. 4689, with its supplements,
provides for the auditing of the accounts of
the supervisors, and for the preparation bythe auditors of a report, directs where the
report shall be deposited, and, in section,
104, authorizes the supervisors to appeal

therefrom "to the court of common pleas
of the same county within thirty days.")
Thereupon the court may direct an issue.
The report of the auditors, unappealed
from, is as conclusive as a judgment. Its
correctness cannot be assailed collaterally,
e. g. in an action on the official bond of the
supervisor.-Dyer v. Covingt6n Township,
2SPa. 186. If his claim is disallowed by
the auditors, he cannot resort to a common
law action. The specific remedy furnished
by the act of 1834 excludes the common
law remedy.-Brown v. White Deer Township, 27 Pa. 109. Analbgously, the report
of county auditors unappealed from, is
conclusive. The sheriff disappointed by
them must appeal. He cannot sue the
county.-County of Northampton v. Herman, 119 Pa. 373. Their- report is conclusive collaterally, e. g. in an action on the
treasurer's official bond.-Blackmore v.
Allegheny County, 51 Pa. 160. It concludes
the county, if not appealed from, as against
its treasurer, Northumberland County v.
Bloom, 3 W. & S. 542; and it concludesthe
treasurer, Nofthampton County v. Yoke,
24Pa. 305. Day, the plaintiff, if dissatisfied
with the decision of the auditors, should
have appealed therefrom to the common
pleas within 30 days. Except on appeal,
that court cannot acquire jurisdiction of
his claim. Judgment will therefore be entered on the case stated, in favor of the
Township of Newton, the defendant.

GEORGE EDWARD REED, D. D.. LL. D..
President, Dickitnson School of Law.

